We present a new measure of degree of centrahty in a social network which is based on a natural extension of the Banzhaf (1965) index of power in an N-person game.
Introduction
Beginning with the pioneering experiments of Alex Bavelas (1948 Bavelas ( , 1950 , there has been considerable research interest in the issue of how group structure, in particular the pattern of (feasible) communication flows, affects various elements of group process. The usual method of research has been to impose various communication networks on groups and then to examine the consequences for group process. One area which has been the focus of a considerable amount of research is the study of how communication structures affect group members' perceptions of the existence of individuals who are seen to be engaged in a leadership role and/or facilitate or hind& the emergence of those patterns of behavior which are commonly labeled leadership.
We show in Fig which have most frequently been investigated. While most investigators have looked at communication networks, the graphs in Fig. 1 can be more generally interpreted in terms of any specified binary relationship. For the moment, however, we shall stick with graphs which will be interpreted in terms of communication structure. In seeking to predict which individual or individuals would be seen to be acting as (or would emerge as) leaders and in studying the effect of communication networks on information flows, a number of authors (e.g. Leavitt 1951; Shaw 1954; Goldberg 1955; Shaw and Rothschild 1956; Cohen 1962) have made use of the idea of "centrality" in a graph-theoretic network. The hypothesis has been that the more central a position in a network. the more likely is the occupant of that position to emerge as (or be seen as) a leader. As Freeman (1977) has shown, the notion of "centrality" has a number of distinct meanings, although many of these give rise to convergent orderings of points for the case of the simpler network structures. Freeman (1979) the Banzhaf (1965) power index. The measure we shall propose has some conceptual links to the notion of centrality as betweenness offered in Freeman (1977) . Like the measures in Freeman ( 1977) and Freeman, Roeder and Mulholland ( 1979) the measure we propose will be applicable to both connected and unconnected graphs.
The Banzhaf index of power
For illustrative purposes, we shall show how the Banzhaf (1965) index ' is defined for a weighted voting game. Consider a set of N actors {(1,2,3 ,..., n)}, where the i th actor has weight w,, 0 < w, G 1 and Zw, = 1. Define the quota q, 0 < q < 1 as the number of weighted votes needed for a motion to carry. Define a coalition as winning if the sum of the weights of its members is equal to or greater than q. Grofman (1981) , and Grofman and Scarrow (1979, 1981 An alternative is a total power score. In any network with N actors there are potentially (2"-1) winning coalitions. We define the total Banzhaf power index, B,', as B,' = number of swings for actor i
A simple illustration is helpful. Let us consider a three-person game with w, = 0.4, wz = 0.4, y = 0.2; q = 0.51. There are eight possible coalitions (see Table 1 ). Despite the fact that Actors 1 and 2 have weights twice that of Actor 3, in Banzhaf power terms they are all equal. Consider the same game, but with q = 2/3. Now, Actors 1 and 2 have Banzhaf relative power scores of 0.5, while Actor 3 has a power index of zero.' However, for Actors 1 and 3 absolute power scores are unchanged.
Applications of the Banzhaf index to communication networks
Now let us see how these ideas can be applied to communication networks.
For communication networks, let us define a winning coalition as a path from actorj to actor k, for any actorsj, k,j # k. Define a swing (decisive vote) for actor i, to be a winning coalition containing i, from which i's defection would be crucial, i.e. such that without actor i, the remaining member of the coalition cannot construct from among their own members a path from j to k. Define the relative centrality of ' We could also have defined the Banzhaf index in terms of votes which turn coalitions from losing into winning. Because of symmetry. in general the LWO definitions will be equivalent.
' In the language of game theory. Player 3 is said to be a dummv. Table 1 Banzhaf 
Define the total centrality of an actor as cy = number of swings for actor
The reason for the denominator in expression (4) is that this is the maximum possible number of swings. In fact, for each k (= 1,. . . ,n), player i can belong to (r_: ) different sets with k players. Each such set can provide a path between any of (i) pairs of players. All told this gives us possible swings. Some algebra can then be used to show that this last sum is indeed equal to the denominator in expression (4). Some illustrations will again be helpful. Consider first the three-per-B. Grofmun und G. Owen / Centrulr!, rn so&l networks son wheel pattern of Fig. 1 . There are six winning coalitions (I, 2), (2, 1). (2,3), (3,2), (3,2, 1) and (1,2,3). Note that (1,2) is distinct from (2, 1) since the former is a coalition involving a path from 2 to 1, while the latter is a coalition involving a path from 1 to 2. If all connections are bidirectional, then by symmetry we need consider only half the possible cases. Since we wish to consider graphs both with bidirectional and unidirectional elements, we shall present all feasible coalitions even if symmetry would make it possible for us to reduce the set. In the first four of these coalitions both members are crucial; in the last two all three are critical. Hence the total number of swings for player 1 is four and the same is true for player 3, while for player 2 the total number of swings is six. Hence, B, = 2/7, B, = 3/7, B, = 2/7. While in this example values of C,' are almost identical to those for B,, in general C,C,' G 1, while Z,C, = 1. 4 We can show that the relative power of the central actor in a wheel pattern is a monotonically decreasing function of N but with an asymptote of l/3, while the relative power of any hub actor is roughly inverse to N. For N = 4 (with B, in the hub), we have twelve winning coalitions:
(1,2), (1,2,3), (1,2,4), (2, l), (2,3), (2,4), (3,2, l), (3,2), (3,2,4). 
4 Alternatively, we might wish to exclude from swmgs the initiating and terminating pomts of any commumcation and measure only "middleman" power. If we did this, then B, = B, =O. and E, -I. This idea of "middleman power" is closer in spirit to what is proposed in Freeman (1977) .
Which of these two measures is more appropriate will depend upon the group process being investigated.
If Actor 2 wishes to communicate with Actor I or Actor 3, these actors have the power to deny Actor 2 his wish, and our basic approach to defining relative power (which credits both players with a swing in any pairwise linkage) would appear the best.
and for i # 2, the total centrality of all non-hub actors is
Also, the ratio of B, to CB, (or of C; to CC,') is simply 2( N -1)/N. The distinction between totul power share and relative power ratio is important.
It may be that actors are seen as central when their power is large relative to that of any other actor, even if it may not be especially large relative to the combined total of all other actors or to the maximum possible number of swings (cf. Freeman 1977: 39) . However, for simplicity of exposition we shall focus on B, (i.e. C,) rather than on C',' in the discussion that follows. (1,2), (1,2,3), (1,3), (2, l), (2,3, l), (2,3), (2, 1,3), (3, 1) and (3, 1,2). However, not all actors are decisive in each. Consider, for example, the winning coalition (1,2,3): Actor 2 is not essential, since the (1,3) coalition exists. Analogous results obtain for the (2,3, 1) and (2, 1,3) coalition.
On the other hand, for the (3, 1,2) coalition all actors are decisive, since no alternative path between 3 and 2 exists. When we count swings we obtain seven for Actor 1, six for Actor 2, and six for This is a good point in our discussion to emphasize two features of the model we have been using. We have implicitly been assuming, first, that all winning coalitions are equally likely and, second, that all winning coalitions are equally important.
There is nothing in the nature of the mathematics we have been using that constrains us to restrict ourselves to these assumptions.
If, for example, we are dealing with, say, battlefield communications, then we might wish to look at only a restricted set of what we've been calling "winning coalitions," or to weight certain important communication linkages more heavily than others. Also, we might wish to drop the assumption of all coalitions being equally likely, if other features of the group or its members permit us to infer that some communication interactions will be more frequent than others. (For treatments of directly analogous issues in voting games, see Owen 1971; Straffin 1977; Merrill 1978, and Frank and Shapley 1981.) 5 For example we might wish to deal only with the 'Another alternative to the approach suggested above is also worth mentionmg. In this modification we would calculate Banzhaf power scores for the winning coalitions separote!v for each (r,j) linkage and then average these index values for the entire set of (I.,) pairs -takmg a weighted average if not all (l.j) pairs were to be regarded as being of equal Importance -rather than looking at power share based on all winning coalitions as we did above. This modiflcatlon would affect all the calculations we presented, although the differences wll m general be minor. For example, for the three-person wheel (if we assign equal weight to the SLX possible two-way links), we would have B, = E, = 17/60 and 8, =28/60, rather than B, = E, = 217 and B, = 3/7. managers is decisive in 11, and the 10 workers are each decisive in 2 winning coalitions each. The middle-level managers each have power scores of 0.20 compared to the top-level boss's power score of 0.22 and the workers' power scores of roughly 0.04 each. This may seem like a somewhat strange result, but it merely reflects the fact that, as we have drawn the organizational chart in Fig. 2 (right-hand), the top-level boss cannot transmit orders directly to the workers, while the middle-level managers can. Thus, the model reflects, perhaps quite realistically, the "power" of those supervisors (e.g. shop foremen) in direct supervision over large numbers of workers. Of course, if we modify our model so as to differently weight the importance of commands, treating commands issued to higher levels of management as more important than commands issued merely to workers, or if we change the organization chart to allow top management to bypass middle-management in setting policies which control the workers, then the Banzhaf measure will show an increase in the power of top management relative to that of middle management.
With 
